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ABSTRACT—The revival of the nondelegation doctrine, foreshadowed last 
term in Gundy v. United States, signals the end of a distinctive style of legal 
and political thought. The doctrine’s apparent demise after the 1930s 
facilitated the development of a methodological approach that embodied 
what Lon Fuller once called “the spirit of the Federalist Papers”: an open-
ended engagement with the problem of designing democracy and controlling 
public power. At its best, this discourse was critical and propulsive, with 
each purported solution generating more questions than it answered. The turn 
against congressional delegations will likely bring to a close this period of 
open and self-critical experimentation. In its place, we are likely to see the 
emergence of warring visions of the administrative state, each claiming 
legitimacy—neither credibly—according to its own comprehensive 
normative doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1963, the United States’ leading professor of jurisprudence issued a 
provocative call to rethink administrative law.1 Legality, Lon Fuller 
observed, depended on certain fundamental attributes—an “internal 
morality”—that demanded a minimal degree of clarity, generality, 
prospectivity, and consistency in application, and a system that wholly 
lacked one of these attributes would not be a “legal system” in any 
meaningful sense of the term.2 It was not lost on Fuller that law’s internal 
morality presented a fundamental challenge for the administrative state, 
which was then about to enter a period of remarkable growth. A legal system 
of clear, stable, and generally applicable rules laid down in advance was 
well-suited to facilitating free-market capitalism, but these same principles 
stood in fundamental tension with alternative, more interventionist forms of 
social and economic organization.3 To the extent that modern government 
was called upon to intervene in markets, regulate industry, and set 
contentious social policy, Fuller’s internal morality of law would seem an 
obstacle rather than an ideal.4 It seemed, in other words, that we were faced 
with a zero-sum choice: either uphold the rule of law or embrace the 
administrative state. 
This dilemma, Fuller insisted, required a careful and critical response. 
The emerging institutions of the administrative state would entail tradeoffs 
 
 1 See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969). This, of course, is not how 
Lon Fuller’s 1963 Storrs Lectures, later published as the Morality of Law, are ordinarily remembered 
today; lawyers and legal theorists are far more likely to have encountered Fuller in the context of the 
ongoing debate between positivism and natural law. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Inner Morality 
of Private Law, 58 AM. J. JURIS. 27, 27–31 (2013). Others have noted the potential incompatibility of 
Fuller’s theory of law to the administrative state, though they understate the extent to which Fuller himself 
grappled with these issues. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 397–408 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some 
Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 444 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The 
Morality of Administrative Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1927 (2018). 
 2 FULLER, supra note 1, at 33–94, 96. 
 3 See id. at 24–25 (citing FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944)); E. B. Pashukanis, 
The General Theory of Law and Marxism, in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 111, 111-225 (Hugh W. Babb 
trans., 1951). See generally Lon L. Fuller, Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: A Study in the Development of 
Marxist Legal Theory, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1157 (1949). 
 4 See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 1, at 170–81. 
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between the internal morality of law and other pressing social values and 
policies—tradeoffs that can have profound ramifications for individuals’ 
lives and for the use of public power.5 It would be a mistake to assume that 
the new institutions of the administrative state must be governed according 
to the same principles of legality that applied to the institutions of laissez-
faire capitalism, just as it would be a mistake to indiscriminately deploy 
governmental power for one’s chosen ends without any concern for 
institutional checks.6 In other words, the growth of administrative power 
demanded not a zero-sum choice, but subtle and ongoing attention to the 
problems of institutional design: “Something like the spirit of the Federalist 
Papers will become essential—a spirit at once inquiring and constructive.”7 
This Essay reconstructs what Fuller meant by the “spirit of the 
Federalist Papers” and argues that something like this spirit actually did 
come to characterize the theory and practice of U.S. administrative law in 
the ensuing decades. Fuller’s “spirit,” at least as this Essay reconstructs it, 
denotes a continuing and open-ended engagement with the problems of 
designing institutions to control and channel political power. It is concerned 
with the values that are embedded and reflected in everyday institutional 
arrangements, and it seeks to bring those values to light and subject them to 
scrutiny.8 This spirit is “inquiring and constructive,”9 in the sense that its 
practitioners are constantly seeking new ways to design regulatory policies, 
programs, and bureaucracies. The process of investigation, critique, and 
revision is ongoing as successive generations continually attempt to find “the 
most apt institutional design for governmental control”10 over a changing 
economy. The “spirit of the Federalist Papers,” then, is exemplary of what 
Jeremy Waldron calls “political political theory—theory addressing itself to 
politics and to the way our political institutions house and frame our 
disagreements about social ideals and orchestrate what is done about 
whatever aims we can settle on.”11 
 
 5 See id. at 179. Fuller’s argument thus presages the “institutional choice” approach outlined in NEIL 
K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY (1994). 
 6 FULLER, supra note 1, at 181. 
 7 Id. 
 8 For an approach that bears a family resemblance to Fuller’s spirit, but in a different substantive and 
philosophical tradition, see Joshua Kleinfeld, A Theory of Criminal Victimization, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1087, 
1151 (2013). 
 9 See FULLER, supra note 1, at 181. 
 10 Id. at 175. In a passage notable for its relevance to the present day, Fuller stresses that the 
administrative apparatus has already struggled to grapple with transformations in the economy and warns 
that it will in the future have to deal with “the as yet largely unfaced dislocations that will be brought by 
increasing automation.” Id. at 176. 
 11 JEREMY WALDRON, POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS 6 (2016). 
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In the U.S. administrative state, Fuller’s own call for a renewed spirit 
of engagement may have been largely ignored,12 but his words nonetheless 
proved prophetic. Over the next decade, a discourse emerged that 
interrogated the normative foundations of the administrative state, asking 
whether and on what terms it could be legitimated by reference to democratic 
principles.13 At its best, this discourse was critical and propulsive, with each 
purported solution generating more questions than it answered.14 The 
administrative state became a distinctive and productive laboratory for 
rethinking the role of democratic governance under conditions of extreme 
complexity: “massive” and “wicked” problems,15 the demand for extensive 
technical knowledge,16 and globalization.17 But this thinking took place—had 
to take place—against a background assumption, with which Fuller 
concurred, that the kind of administrative state we need will never be 
effectively controlled and legitimated through general and prospective rules 
laid down in advance by a watchful legislator. 
This background assumption, of course, was never shared by a large 
and influential proportion of U.S. politicians and legal professionals who 
remained skeptical of the administrative state. On June 20, 2019, this 
skeptical position secured a preliminary but significant victory in Gundy v. 
United States, wherein four Justices signaled their desire to reconsider the 
Court’s longstanding, hands-off approach to broad delegations by Congress 
to administrative agencies.18 On this view, the proper guide for designing, 
coordinating, and legitimating the administrative state is not the “spirit” of 
the Federalist Papers, but the Federalist Papers themselves, along with other 
indicia of the Constitution’s original meaning and purpose.19 And the 
Constitution, on the skeptical view, forbids overly broad delegations from 
 
 12 I have found no other piece engaging specifically with this part of Fuller’s best-known work. In 
preparing this piece, I was surprised to find I may be the only law review author to have expressly 
referenced this “spirit of the Federalist Papers,” despite more than 1,800 citing references to Fuller’s book 
in leading legal databases. See J. Benton Heath, Global Emergency Power in the Age of Ebola, 57 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 47 (2016). 
 13 See infra Part I. 
 14 See, e.g., infra notes 50–52 and accompanying text (describing the emergence of a model of 
“interest representation” in administrative law and the problems attending that model). 
 15 E.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the 
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 72–79 (2010). 
 16 E.g., Martin Shapiro, “Deliberative,” “Independent” Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will 
the Globe Echo the E.U.?, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 342–44 (2005). 
 17 See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (describing the 
emergence of global regulatory networks). 
 18 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2118–20 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting). 
 19 See id. at 2133–35 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
282 
Congress to the Executive, and empowers the federal courts to police and 
invalidate those delegations in the service of individual liberty and 
deliberative democracy.20 
The upshot of this approach is that the broad delegations on which much 
of the administrative state is founded may now be “under siege,”21 awaiting 
only a clever litigant and a fifth vote from Justice Kavanaugh, who took no 
part in Gundy. Commentators have already observed that the resurrection of 
the nondelegation doctrine would jeopardize large segments of the 
administrative state and make future ambitious policymaking all the more 
difficult by forcing Congress to reach far broader agreement before passing 
legislation.22 Four Supreme Court Justices appear to agree, warning that if 
the measure in Gundy is impermissible, as the dissent argues, then “most of 
Government is unconstitutional.”23 In the wake of the Gundy dissent, 
commentators have argued that the administrative state is too much a 
practical necessity, that the nondelegation doctrine is too blunt a tool, and 
that its resurrection is neither required by the Constitution nor normatively 
desirable.24  
The argument I advance here is at a different level of reflection. I 
contend that this turn against congressional delegations signifies a profound 
transformation in our political and intellectual life. It brings to a close 
whatever was left of the broadly experimentalist approach to institutional 
design that was presaged in Fuller’s lectures. In the place of an ongoing, self-
critical search for legitimacy, we are likely to find hardened battle lines, with 
each side offering a romanticized ideal model of governance. This is not only 
 
 20 See id. at 2134–35. 
 21 See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017) (charting the rise of “anti-administrativism” on the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 22 See, e.g., Todd Tucker, How a Sex Offender’s Case Before the Supreme Court Could Bring Down 
the Administrative State, POLITICO (June 2, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/ 
06/02/supreme-court-gundy-rapist-227038 [https://perma.cc/9AMT-LDCV]; Nicholas Bagley, Opinion, 
‘Most of Government Is Unconstitutional,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/06/21/opinion/sunday/gundy-united-states.html [https://perma.cc/6DZX-DLHZ]. 
 23 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130 (plurality opinion). 
 24 See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 22 (“To run a functional, modern government, Congress has no choice 
but to delegate authority and discretion to federal agencies. Doing so allows Congress to make use of 
agencies’ resources and scientific expertise, to enable a nimble response to emerging problems and to 
insulate technocratic decisions from raw politics.”); Scott Lemieux, Wait a Minute, Could John Roberts 
Block All of This?, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 27, 2019), https://prospect.org/day-one-agenda/chief-justice-
roberts-block-executive-authority [https://perma.cc/45YF-FBDR] (warning that the revival of the 
nondelegation doctrine could frustrate initiatives by a progressive governing coalition); Julian Davis 
Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding (Dec. 31, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3512154 [https://perma.cc/H8DP-W6B9] (arguing that the nondelegation 
doctrine, as understood by contemporary conservative judges and scholars, was not part of the original 
constitutional understanding). 
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a reflection of our oft-bemoaned political polarization. It also represents the 
loss of a distinctive style of legal and political inquiry, which continually 
sought to reconsider and reconcile the demands of democratic 
constitutionalism with the exigencies of contemporary life. 
This is not, in other words, an additional argument for keeping the 
nondelegation doctrine in mothballs. The observations presented here are 
unlikely to move the needle for anyone who is ideologically opposed to the 
modern expansion of the administrative state or who believes that “most of 
the modern national government is wildly, absurdly, it-is-not-even-a-close-
call-obviously unconstitutional.”25 The purpose of this reflection is, instead, 
to mark a transformative shift in our constitutional and administrative 
politics. What is at stake in this shift, I argue, is the important role of U.S. 
administrative agencies in testing what democracy can and should look like 
in an increasingly complex, technocratic, and globalized world. And, unlike 
the fight over the nondelegation doctrine itself, which still must play out in 
the courts, this shift may have already taken place. 
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I argues that the decade 
following Fuller’s lecture did indeed lead to a spirit of constructive, crucial, 
and principled engagement with the administrative state, which left a heavy 
mark on administrative law scholarship and practice both in the United States 
and abroad. Part II then turns to the dissenting opinion in Gundy, which 
heralds a return of the nondelegation doctrine, and shows how the approach 
announced in this opinion signals a radical shift in the political discourse. 
Part III concludes by considering the implications of this shift for our ability 
to critically engage and experiment with alternatives in institutional design. 
I. THE “SPIRIT OF THE FEDERALIST PAPERS”  
IN U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
The complex of agencies, bureaucrats, regulations, and practices that 
make up the administrative state is in some ways the most salient feature of 
modern government.26 Whether one is running a business, receiving public 
assistance, muddling through airport security, or, like Herman Gundy, 
negotiating the immense and often lifelong consequences of being convicted 
of a crime,27 administrative law is a part of one’s life, even more so than the 
 
 25 Gary Lawson, Right About the Constitution, BALKINIZATION (June 5, 2019), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/06/right-about-constitution.html [https://perma.cc/Y9X4-9JZB]. 
 26 “Modern government,” as one leading casebook puts it, “is administrative government.” STEPHEN 
G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 1 
(6th ed. 2006). 
 27 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133. 
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police or the courts.28 And the administrative state today, established on the 
basis of broad delegations of statutory authority, presents itself as a near-
inevitability, as the federal government is called upon to regulate a wide 
range of activities.29 
When Fuller delivered his Storrs Lectures in 1963, the U.S. 
administrative state was about to enter its most dramatic period of expansion 
since the New Deal.30 The administrative state’s ability to harness the power 
of law and political organization in pursuit of substantive ends was both 
enticing and anxiety-provoking, particularly for those who had grown up in 
the aftermath of a world war against fascism and in the shadow of the Soviet 
Union.31 Specific critiques leveled against the administrative state in earnest 
during this period included charges of pervasive regulatory capture, demands 
that agencies respect entitlements arising from social programs, and a 
renewed push among business interests toward deregulation.32 More 
generally, critics began to express the concern that the concentration of 
regulatory authority in the hands of a national executive had brought about 
“Madison’s Nightmare”: extensive centralized power organized through an 
unintelligible cacophony of warring factional bureaucracies.33 
Writing at the high-water mark of this expansion, Richard Stewart 
identified a transformation not only in the structure of the administrative 
state, but in its legitimating principles.34 Stewart observed that the “ultimate 
problem” of administrative law “is to control and validate the exercise of 
essentially legislative powers by . . . agencies that do not enjoy the formal 
legitimation of one-person one-vote election.”35 For a long time, the 
legitimacy of the administrative state was presumed to derive from 
congressional delegation: Congress defined the terms of the agency’s power, 
 
 28 See Daniel Carpenter, The Evolution of National Bureaucracy in the United States, in 
INSTITUTIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 41, 41 (Joel D. Aberbach & Mark 
A. Peterson eds. 2005). For an example of routine contact with the administrative state, see William H. 
Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983), which 
analyzes encounters of welfare recipients with an increasingly bureaucratized and legalized public 
assistance system. 
 29 See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 107 (2010). 
 30 See generally BREYER ET AL., supra note 26, at 22. 
 31 See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1973) 
(addressing the legitimation problems that arise with state management of the economy); DILEMMAS OF 
LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1985) (tracing the impact of the postwar welfare 
state on law and legal institutions). 
 32 BREYER ET AL., supra note 26, at 23–24. 
 33 Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 342 (1990) (citing THEODORE 
J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 200–06 (2d ed. 1978)). 
 34 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 
1670–71 (1975) [hereinafter Stewart, Reformation]. 
 35 Id. at 1688. 
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and Congress could take it back.36 Traditional administrative law, in other 
words, “conceives of the agency as a mere transmission belt for 
implementing legislative directives.”37 Stewart demonstrated the failure of 
this transmission belt model, both in practice and in the public and theoretical 
imagination, as the problems of the New Deal and afterward demanded ever-
broader delegations from Congress.38 These problems became even more 
acute in the 1960s and 1970s as the administrative state’s role in allocating 
private benefits and burdens, and the reality of capture by regulated interests, 
became increasingly salient.39 
The breakdown of the transmission belt was also what had troubled 
Fuller about the administrative state, though with a different emphasis. The 
transmission belt offered an account of the administrative state’s legitimacy, 
which depended on stable, generally applicable guidance from a 
democratically elected Congress.40 Fuller was not directly focused on 
democracy or legitimacy, but he was equally concerned with the role of law 
in setting down clear, generally applicable and prospective rules that 
constrain official discretion.41 But already in 1963, Fuller recognized that this 
conception did not describe much of what was happening in the 
administrative state.42 He argued that much of the administrative state’s 
intervention into the economy dealt with “polycentric problems”: complex 
matters of distribution that cannot be resolved through rule-governed 
adjudication.43 Fuller recognized that law’s emphasis on generality, 
consistency, and stability was not appropriate to many of the tasks assigned 
to the administrative state, and that these tasks called instead for something 
like private ordering or for a kind of administrative managerialism.44 As the 
state becomes increasingly concerned with managing the economy, 
questions of institutional design would become paramount, and Fuller 
argued strongly against “unthinkingly” carrying over traditional models into 
 
 36 Id. at 1675 & nn.20–22. 
 37 Id. 
 38 E.g., id. at 1676–81. 
 39 Id. at 1681–88. 
 40 Id. at 1675–76. 
 41 FULLER, supra note 1, at 39. 
 42 Id. at 46 (“In recent history perhaps the most notable failure to achieve general rules has been that 
of certain of our regulatory agencies, particularly those charged with allocative functions.”). 
 43 See id. at 29 (first citing MICHAEL POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY: REFLECTIONS AND 
REJOINDERS (1951); then citing MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1958)); Lon L. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 54 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 1, 3–5 (1960) [hereinafter Fuller, Adjudication]; Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–404 (1978). 
 44 FULLER, supra note 1, at 173; Fuller, Adjudication, supra note 43, at 5. 
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this new era.45 What was needed, Fuller concluded, was a renewed 
engagement with these problems of institutional design—an engagement 
that required “[s]omething like the spirit of the Federalist Papers.”46 
This does not mean that the administrative state is fundamentally 
inconsistent with Fuller’s rule of law values. Administrative agencies can—
and often do—use the discretion granted by Congress to craft detailed 
systems of rules, which adopt to some extent all of Fuller’s criteria.47 In 
principle, courts could also require agencies to constrain broad statutory 
discretion through rulemaking, thereby reintroducing Fuller’s internal 
morality into the administrative state.48 But, insofar as this rulemaking took 
place without congressional guidance, there would need to be an alternative 
account of its legitimacy, which would in turn affect the form and process 
for agency self-control. The need for a legitimating rationale applies a 
fortiori to the “new modes of governance” that today characterize much of 
the administrative state, which do not take the form of rules but of “priority 
setting, resource allocation, research, planning, targeting, guidance, and 
strategic enforcement.”49 
Following Fuller’s call for renewed engagement, new models of 
administrative design and legitimation in fact began to emerge. Stewart, in 
particular, argued that courts responded to the failure of the transmission belt 
by developing an alternative “interest representation” model of 
administration.50 Pursuant to this model, courts reconceived administrative 
policymaking as providing “a surrogate political process to ensure the fair 
representation of a wide range of affected interests.”51 Interest representation 
was by no means a panacea to the administrative state’s legitimacy 
problems—Stewart actually thought it was deeply problematic—but it 
nonetheless could herald a “new conception of administrative law and . . . 
political theory . . . forming among the ruins of the old.”52 
 
 45 FULLER, supra note 1, at 176. 
 46 Id. at 181. 
 47 See generally Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 859 (2009). 
 48 See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 725–30 (1969). 
Some of these proposals were eventually foreclosed by the Supreme Court. See Sunstein & Vermeule, 
supra note 1, at 1936–44. 
 49 Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL 
L. REV. 95, 97 (2003). 
 50 Stewart, Reformation, supra note 34, at 1723; see also Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, 
The “Reformation of American Administrative Law” Revisited, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 782 (2015) 
(resituating this court-centric narrative within broader political developments). 
 51 Stewart, Reformation, supra note 34, at 1670. 
 52 Id. at 1811. 
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This approach took hold in the literature. Over the following decades, 
scholars looked closely at emerging administrative practices and court 
decisions to find hints of alternative models of administrative legitimacy; 
they built their own models, interrogated them, and attempted to imagine 
alternative ways of reconstructing the administrative state, or the state 
itself.53 These were not simply rarefied academic theorizing: the models 
developed in this body of work were frequently built on the close 
examination of particular regulatory schemes,54 and their authors moved 
back and forth between policymaking roles and academia.55 By the end of 
the twentieth century, the administrative state—both in theory and in 
practice—was littered with competing models for its legitimation.56 
During this period, much scholarship on the administrative state took 
on Fuller’s “spirit of the Federalist Papers.” By way of background, the 
Federalist Papers examine in close detail the (then-proposed) constitutional 
structure of U.S. government, identifying the implications of even the small 
details of that structure for what would now be called political science and 
 
 53 See, e.g., PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD 
RESPONSIVE LAW (1978) (offering a model of “responsive law” premised on open texture, flexibility, and 
change); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003) (arguing for a focus on non-arbitrariness as the central 
principle of administrative legitimacy); Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The 
Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009) (arguing that the federal 
government’s use of dealmaking suggests an alternative regulatory paradigm that should inform 
discussions on regulatory reform); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (identifying an alternative form of governance based 
on direct participation, information pooling, goal-setting, and mutual learning); Jody Freeman, 
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997) (sketching a model of 
“collaborative governance” based on public-private responsibility sharing); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (arguing that direct presidential control over regulation 
has displaced earlier models and is normatively and legally defensible); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: 
The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 
342 (2004) (charting the rise of “new governance” based on flexibility, public-private collaboration, and 
decentralization, among other characteristics); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and 
Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011) (contrasting the democratic 
experimentalist model of regulation with “minimalist” approaches); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican 
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992) (arguing that a theory of civic 
republicanism, based on participation and deliberation, best justifies the bureaucratic state); Sidney 
Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463 (2012) (arguing for an alternative model of administrative legitimacy 
based on expertise, deliberation, and reason-giving). 
 54 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 53, at 55–66 (focusing on specific environmental permit 
negotiations). 
 55 Justice Elena Kagan, who is cited supra note 53 and is the author of the plurality opinion in Gundy, 
is only the most salient example. 
 56 See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 
439–46, 448–53 (2003) (discussing five models or approaches of U.S. administrative law). 
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political theory.57 To be sure, this was anything but a dispassionate analysis, 
having been prepared as an intervention into the political battle in New York 
over the future of the Republic.58 But despite, or perhaps because of, the 
Federalist Papers’ rough-and-tumble origins, its authors were engaged in a 
deep reflection on the design of political institutions, and the values served 
by the separations and connections between various government 
departments.59 
The thinking about the administrative state in recent decades took on a 
similarly detail-oriented, institutionally minded approach to legitimacy. In 
Stewart’s foundational account, for example, the new model of interest 
representation could be found in liberalized standing requirements, broader 
participation rights, and the demand to give “due regard” for the views of 
stakeholders.60 We could use this model to then identify potential challenges 
(such as the problem of identifying stakeholders or gauging the impact of 
representation on decision-making),61 and, with the help of political theory, 
imagine how extending the model might resolve or exacerbate these 
challenges.62 Subsequent projects found new material for this kind of mid-
level theorizing in negotiated rulemaking procedures,63 agency-made 
standard-setting processes,64 or in federal and local standards and processes 
for governing primary education,65 among other subjects. 
But this approach also deviated from the Federalist Papers in two 
important respects. First, the Federalist Papers’ authors were presenting 
what was essentially a done deal to the U.S. public.66 The administrative 
state, by contrast, was and remains a work in progress. Scholars and 
practitioners of administrative law were, to use an expression that became 
familiar during my short time in government, “building the airplane while 
 
 57 One could point to any essay to support this point, but a particularly vivid example is Madison’s 
sendup of the “political maxim” that each department must be fully separate. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 
47 (James Madison). 
 58 PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION 84–86 (2010). 
 59 WALDRON, supra note 11, at 279. 
 60 Stewart, Reformation, supra note 34, at 1723–60. 
 61 Id. at 1760–90. 
 62 Id. at 1790–1802. 
 63 Freeman, supra note 53, at 33–40. 
 64 Shapiro et al., supra note 53, at 491–501. 
 65 See generally James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: 
The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 
184 (2003). 
 66 See MAIER, supra note 58, at 69, 86. 
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flying it.”67 On this view, the administrative state is less something that needs 
to be legitimated and “sold” to a skeptical public, and more something that 
can be tinkered with, retheorized, and rethought in light of new internal 
developments or external challenges. 
Second, because of this state of constant flux, much of the work on the 
administrative state took a decidedly critical approach to the problem of its 
legitimation. This is in opposition to much of Western political and legal 
theory which, for either transparently political reasons or for the sake of 
academic inquiry, have sought to explain why the existing social order is 
legitimate, or how it might be rendered so.68 Stewart again provides the 
paradigmatic example of the critical approach: he expressly describes his 
work as being “descriptive and critical” rather than normative, and he is 
neither nostalgic for the broken transmission belt model of the administrative 
state nor particularly optimistic about the prospects of his “interest group 
representation” model.69 The point of his investigation is not to identify the 
“right” recipe for legitimating the administrative state, but rather to 
recognize how the ongoing need for legitimation is reshaping the state, how 
small changes in doctrine or practice can signal alternative visions of our 
social order, and how these alternatives might respond to existing problems 
even as they generate new ones. 
The result was a brand of intellectual engagement that treated the 
administrative state as a permanent problem, rather than as a sanctified part 
of the political order. We are stuck with the administrative state, it says, but 
we must neither embrace it nor reject it in favor of a romanticized past. The 
result is a constant churn, as new and emerging ideas take root in various 
corners of the state and compete to remake our institutions from the inside 
out—whether they be interest group pluralism, civic republicanism, 
presidential administration democratic experimentalism, new governance, or 
analytic management. To be sure, some theorists were more sanguine about 
their preferred governance model.70 But this very methodology, which was 
based on excavating and modeling the legitimating ideas already embedded 
in institutional practices, carried with it the germ of critical legal studies, 
with its emphasis on mapping existing arrangements and reconstructing 
 
 67 This approach may echo the street-level approach to regulatory programs by the regulators 
themselves. See Josh Pacewicz, The Regulatory Road to Reform: Bureaucratic Activism, Agency 
Advocacy, and Medicaid Expansion within the Delegated Welfare State, 46 POL. & SOC. 571, 574 (2018). 
 68 For two succinct phrasings of the problem, both of which are emblematic of much normative 
jurisprudence and political theory, see JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 49 (Betty 
Radice & Robert Baldick eds., Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762), and JOHN RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 137 (1993). 
 69 Stewart, Reformation, supra note 34, at 1670. 
 70 See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 53, at 283–89; Seidenfeld, supra note 53, at 1515. 
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imagined alternatives.71 The “models” that were produced in this fashion thus 
tended to be at least implicitly provisional, contestable, and subject to 
revision.72 
The method proved portable beyond the boundaries of the United 
States. When studying the problems of governance beyond the state, it is 
useful to have tools enabling a searching and self-critical inquiry into the 
legitimation of power absent a direct tether to any electorate. We can 
therefore see hallmarks of the U.S. administrative-law method in studies of 
Europe’s increasingly complex governance structure,73 and in studies of 
global regulatory bodies such as international organizations, transnational 
networks, and private standard-setting bodies.74 These efforts included the 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) project, which explicitly characterized a 
range of public and private global bodies as “administrative” in nature, and 
sought to apply to them the same diagnostic and normative tools familiar to 
national administrative lawyers.75 Critics sometimes dismissed much of this 
 
 71 See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 15–27 (1986); 
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 130–38 (1996) [hereinafter 
UNGER, LEGAL ANALYSIS]. 
 72 See, e.g., JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM 175–79 (2002). On 
that approach in general, see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 538–48 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (1989). 
 73 For varying perspectives, see Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative 
Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 642 
(1999) (“Many influential European commentators, as a means of addressing the democratic deficit in 
Europe, increasingly draw inspiration from what they perceive to be the American model of participatory, 
non-hierarchical administration.”); Giandomenico Majone, European Regulatory Agencies: The 
Dilemma of Delegation of Powers in the European Union, in RISK REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: BETWEEN ENLARGEMENT AND INTERNATIONALIZATION 55, 56–57 (Giandomenico Majone ed., 
2003) (applying Stewart’s insights to EU regulatory agencies); Francesca Bignami, From Expert 
Administration to Accountability Network: A New Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law, 
59 AM. J. COMP. L. 859, 868–70 (2011) (tracing the history of challenges to administrative legitimacy in 
U.S. and European scholarship); Ming-Sung Kuo, From Administrative Law to Administrative 
Legitimation? Transnational Administrative Law and the Process of European Integration, 61 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 855, 855 (2012) (drawing on U.S. and comparative administrative law to illuminate 
developments in the EU). 
 74 See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2014) (arguing that 
decision-making in global governance bodies should be subject to the same types of constraints that apply 
in domestic administrative law); Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 763 (2005) (theorizing global administrative networks in a manner similar to Sabel’s 
earlier work on democratic experimentalism in the U.S.); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the 
Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006) (arguing that the tools 
of administrative law should be applied to regulate international policymaking). 
 75 See generally Lorenzo Casini, Global Administrative Law, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY: 
FOUNDATIONS AND FRONTIERS (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3328120 [https://perma.cc/4454-F5FL] (surveying the history of global 
administrative law methodology); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The 
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literature as a naïve and somewhat neoliberal normative project.76 But, in the 
critical spirit of this line of administrative-law scholarship, a great deal of 
work in the GAL vein was dedicated to capturing the normative and practical 
dynamics of institutional churn, reconstructing alternative possible futures 
embedded in existing arrangements, and subjecting them to critique.77 
 
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005) (identifying an emerging 
“global administrative space” that is becoming subject to administrative-law-like requirements such as 
reason-giving, transparency, and review); Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global 
Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 
(2006) (situating these emerging global administrative phenomena in relation to public international law); 
Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, 
Participation, and Responsiveness, 108 AM J. INT’L L. 211 (2014) (conceptualizing accountability in 
global administration). 
 76 See, e.g., David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, in RULING THE WORLD?: 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 37, 64 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & 
Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009). There were also some concerns about GAL’s failure to engage with 
democracy, which were only later addressed by its founders. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., Global 
Administrative Law and Deliberative Democracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 526, 526 (Anne Orford, Florian Hoffman & Martin Clark eds., 2016); Peter L. 
Lindseth, Equilibrium, Demoi-cracy, and Delegation in the Crisis of European Integration, 15 GER. L.J. 
529, 555 (2014); Susan Marks, Naming Global Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 995, 
999–1001 (2005); Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: 
Governance Without Global Government, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 314 (2005). 
 77 See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Upholding Democracy Amid the Challenges of New Technology: What 
Role for the Law of Global Governance?, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9 (2018) (arguing that new technologies 
now pose a fundamental challenge to administrative-law principles that constrain governance 
institutions); B.S. Chimni, Co-option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law, 
37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 799 (2005) (exploring the limited ability of global administrative law to 
constrain imperial power); J. Benton Heath, Managing the “Republic of NGOs”: Accountability and 
Legitimation Problems Facing the UN Cluster System, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 239 (2014) 
(critiquing the emerging “horizontal accountability” structure in the U.N. humanitarian system); Paul 
Mertenskötter & Richard B. Stewart, Remote Control: Treaty Requirements for Regulatory Procedures, 
104 CORNELL L. REV. 165 (2018) (arguing that newer trade treaties are being used to reshape the domestic 
administrative state to favor powerful transnational actors); Bronwen Morgan, Turning Off the Tap: 
Urban Water Service Delivery and the Social Construction of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 215 (2006) (exploring the dual roles of political protest and technical expertise in constructing 
global administrative spaces); Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a 
Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121 (2006) (using the label “global 
administrative law” to expose certain aspects of the investment treaty arbitration system). Of course, U.S. 
administrative law was not the only tradition that had something to say about global institutions. For 
examples drawing on a continental tradition, see THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY BY 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: ADVANCING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW (Armin von 
Bogdandy et al. eds., 2010). For instances from outside the Global North, see, for example, Mariana Mota 
Prado, Presidential Dominance from a Comparative Perspective: The Relationship Between the 
Executive Branch and Regulatory Agencies in Brazil, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 225, 225 
(Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010); Chimni, supra, at 806–11. But, owing to the 
privileged position of U.S. experts and scholars and the influence of the United States on the postwar 
international order, it was particularly influential. On the Western tilt in GAL, see Carol Harlow, Global 
Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187, 187 (2006) (warning 
that administrative law is “primarily a Western construct, protective of Western interests”). 
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All of this intellectual development and expansion was made possible 
by the breakdown of Stewart’s transmission belt. If it were possible to 
control and legitimate the kind of administrative state that we want through 
clear delegations laid down in advance by Congress and reviewed by courts, 
then there would be no need to launch a decades-spanning intellectual project 
to continually reimagine the state’s legitimating principles. There would 
have been no special need to think deeply about which doctrinal and practical 
developments suggest alternative futures for the design of the administrative 
apparatus and its relationship to the governed.78 And there would have been 
few lessons for global and private administrative bodies, or for any discipline 
that studies the legitimation problems facing governance under conditions of 
complexity, electoral breakdown, or globalization. 
This is not to say that the intellectual study of the administrative state 
has been some unqualified good. Certainly, no one has “solved” the 
legitimation problems of the modern administrative state, and even 
seemingly good ideas can be pathological in practice or fall prey to “the 
tendency of any large bureaucracy to water down transformational concepts 
until they cease to have much real meaning.”79 Critics from the left have long 
argued that much of this mainstream scholarship only serves to entrench 
bureaucracy as the dominant form of social organization.80 If theorists are 
too preoccupied by the legitimacy of the administrative state, this argument 
goes, then they may too readily accept the false necessity of bureaucracy and 
too easily presume the legitimacy of the rest of the constitutional structure. 
Other critiques of administrative legitimacy embrace the modern 
necessity for the bureaucratic administrative state but come close to 
suggesting that we jettison any special desire for its democratic legitimation. 
Consider, for instance, Adrian Vermeule’s invocation of Carl Schmitt as a 
basis for theorizing the administrative state,81 or Edward Rubin’s deliberately 
provocative suggestion that we bracket any notion of democracy or 
legitimacy in favor of sterile concepts drawn from management science and 
engineering.82 More recently, Nicholas Bagley forcefully argued that this 
 
 78 No special need, that is, beyond the general problem that in political life nearly every exercise of 
government power suffers from some legitimacy deficit. See infra Part III. 
 79 ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME EVERYTHING 150 
(2016). 
 80 See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 
(1984). For a brief response that probably would not have mollified Frug, see PHILIP SELZNICK, THE 
MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 258–60 (1992). 
 81 Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 (2009); see also 
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the 
Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613 (2009). 
 82 EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN 
STATE (2005). 
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preoccupation with legitimacy has caused progressives to effectively cede 
control over the administrative state to a deregulatory Republican agenda.83  
While Bagley does not reject the need for legitimacy in the administrative 
state, he contends that talk of any “democratic deficit” of agencies vis-à-vis 
the other branches of government is overblown, such that the continuing 
quest for legitimacy among administrative lawyers is a “sucker’s game.”84 
Taken together, these critiques highlight a tension at the center of the 
mainstream intellectual project. Mainstream administrative law and theory, 
as I have described it, attempts to take seriously both the necessity of the 
modern administrative apparatus and its need for democratic legitimation. 
This tension produces two opposite risks. On the one hand, the concession 
to practical necessity could devolve into apologia for the bureaucratic 
administrative state, squeezing out any vision for alternative forms of social 
organization.85 On the other, the endless quest for legitimation risks 
hamstringing effective governance by effectively blessing any procedural 
control, no matter how onerous.86 
This tension, though, is what made the U.S. administrative-law project 
of the past forty years so generative of new ideas. Theories of the 
administrative state that were able to navigate this tension—that could 
maintain a commitment to thinking beyond both the received institutional 
structures and received notions of what it means to be “democratic”—offered 
genuinely novel contributions to the question of what it means to legitimately 
govern under conditions of complexity.87 Such theories were eminently 
practical without abandoning imagination. They were committed to both the 
administrative apparatus and democracy, without purporting to offer a 
romanticized understanding of either. And the U.S. administrative state was, 
on this view, a laboratory for experiments in designing democracy under 
conditions of extreme complexity, technocracy, and globalization. This was, 
perhaps, something like the “spirit of the Federalist Papers” that Fuller 
imagined. 
II. NONDELEGATION’S REVIVAL: DISPELLING FULLER’S SPIRIT? 
The apparent revival of the nondelegation doctrine may signal the end 
of this experimentalist spirit, at least for the time being. As noted above, there 
is a large contingent of theorists, lawyers, and politicians for whom 
everything just said about the “spirit of the Federalist Papers” verges on 
 
 83 Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 348–50 (2019). 
 84 Id. at 377–78. 
 85 This is the outcome that worried Frug, supra note 80, at 1384–88. 
 86 Bagley, supra note 83, at 378. 
 87 See supra note 53 and sources cited therein. 
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dangerous nonsense. On this view, roughly stated, the U.S. Constitution itself 
is the experiment in democracy, and it places broad but significant limits on 
the functions that each branch may perform. For some, these limits render 
much of modern administrative government unconstitutional, at least in its 
current form.88 The administrative state may be an experiment in 
something—it may even be someone’s idea of democracy—but it is not 
constitutional democracy. 
Much of the doctrinal force of this criticism is geared toward restarting 
the transmission belt, and that means reviving the nondelegation doctrine.89 
Most everyone agrees that Congress cannot constitutionally delegate its 
legislative power to any other department or body, but the parameters of this 
limitation are deeply disputed.90 In 1935, the Supreme Court took a relatively 
expansive view of the limitation in two cases, declaring unconstitutional two 
parts of a New Deal-era statute, on the ground that Congress had effectively 
abdicated its legislative function.91 This came to be known as the 
“nondelegation doctrine.” But, since that year, the Court has never again 
applied the doctrine to invalidate a statute, allowing instead for even broad 
policymaking delegations to stand so long as they provide the agency with 
an “intelligible principle” to guide their decisions.92 This broad standard 
effectively acknowledged that the transmission belt was not the way to police 
the administrative state and set the stage for broad delegations to regulate “in 
the public interest” or to impose standards “requisite to protect the public 
health.”93 
 
 88 See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 
(1994). 
 89 See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1978); Gary Lawson, Discretion as 
Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 
(2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 
414–23 (2015). In painting these developments with a broad brush, I am necessarily passing over 
significant differences among critics. Theodore Lowi, for example, was a longtime critic of broad 
delegations and cannot readily be assimilated to any of the political camps that we now see lining up 
around this issue. See generally Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and 
Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295 (1987) [hereinafter Lowi, Serfdom]. 
 90 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1721, 1726 (2002) (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 424–25 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 91 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530–42 (1935) (concerning 
poultry industry regulations that had been adopted pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act of 
1933 (NIRA)); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414–33 (1935) (concerning petroleum trade 
restrictions adopted pursuant to the NIRA). 
 92 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); Touby v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991); see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (plurality 
opinion) (noting that this standard has been applied “time and again”); id. at 2138–41 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (offering a revisionist history of the “intelligible principle” doctrine). 
 93 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (plurality opinion); see infra notes 109–110 and accompanying text. 
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The case Gundy v. United States, decided in June 2019, offered an 
opportunity to take the new Court’s temperature on this expansion. Herman 
Gundy challenged a provision of the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (SORNA), which delegates to the Attorney General the 
authority to “specify the applicability” of the Act’s registration requirements 
to persons who were convicted prior to its enactment.94 Knowingly failing to 
register was a crime that carried a maximum sentence of ten years in prison.95 
Gundy—a pre-enactment sex offender who was convicted of failing to 
register in accordance with the Attorney General’s rules—argued that the 
Act was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because it 
effectively gave the Attorney General carte blanche to legislate crimes.96 
Justice Kagan, announcing the opinion of the Court and writing for a four-
member plurality, categorically rejected the challenge, finding that the Act’s 
structure, purpose, and history provided an “intelligible principle” to guide 
the exercise of delegated authority, placing the statute well within 
constitutional bounds.97 
More interesting going forward, however, are the concurring and 
dissenting opinions, in which four of the Court’s conservative Justices 
signaled a willingness to revive and expand the nondelegation doctrine. 
Concurring in the Court’s judgment, Justice Alito stated that he would 
“support” an effort to “reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 
years” to the nondelegation doctrine, if in a future case a majority of the 
Court would be willing to do so.98 Justice Gorsuch dissented, joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, to argue that he “would not wait” for 
such an opportunity.99 The nondelegation doctrine, Gorsuch argued, is 
essential to securing the Constitution’s promise that “only the people’s 
elected representatives may adopt new federal laws restricting liberty.”100 
The dissenting opinion supports its proposed revival of the 
nondelegation doctrine with a vision of classical liberal constitutionalism.101 
By insisting that Congress agree on the terms of its delegation to 
administrative agencies through ordinary Article I procedures, the 
nondelegation doctrine secures “the people’s liberty” against an “excess of 
 
 94 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (2012); Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122. 
 95 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2012). 
 96 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122. 
 97 Id. at 2129–30 (finding that the law required the Attorney General to order the registration of pre-
SORNA offenders “as soon as feasible” and finding this delegation to be constitutionally sound). 
 98 Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 99 Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 100 Id. 
 101 See id. at 2133–35. 
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law-making” by “mak[ing] lawmaking difficult.”102 The nondelegation 
doctrine also fosters deliberation among lawmakers, promotes the rule of law 
by ensuring the stability and generality of laws, enhances accountability of 
elected officials by forcing them to own their decisions, and generally 
protects minorities by leveraging the separation of powers to ensure that 
“ambition” is made to “counteract ambition.”103 Congress can, consistent 
with these principles, announce a broad regulatory policy and authorize the 
administration to “fill up the details,” make the application of a rule 
dependent on executive factfinding, or delegate to non-legislative 
authorities.104 But, if Congress goes further, then the Court “must call foul 
when the constitutional lines are crossed.”105 
The dissent also sends some rather clear signals that it agrees with 
Justice Kagan’s assertion that “if SORNA’s delegation is unconstitutional, 
then most of Government is unconstitutional . . . .”106 For example, the 
dissent suggests that the “feasibility standard” that the plurality found to 
supply the statute’s “intelligible principle” would not pass constitutional 
muster.107 The dissenting opinion also takes a slight detour to quote Justice 
Douglas’s view that “Congress defaulted when it left it up to an agency to 
do what the ‘public interest’ indicated should be done.”108 These types of 
delegations—requiring agencies to regulate in the public interest or to take 
“feasible” measures—are exactly the sort of provisions that appear in 
numerous statutes previously upheld by the Court, and which form the basis 
 
 102 Id. at 2134 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison)). 
 103 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison)). Notably, Madison’s observation that 
ambition must be made to counteract ambition is also an animating motive behind much mainstream 
scholarship on the structure and legitimation of the administrative state. See, e.g., SELZNICK, supra note 
80, at 334–36 (suggesting that these Madisonian principles have “broader relevance” to public and private 
affairs). 
 104 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 105 Id. at 2135. 
 106 Id. at 2120 (plurality opinion). 
 107 Id. at 2145–46 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The dissent also disagreed with the plurality that the 
statute contained a feasibility standard at all, but more interesting is its discussion of the standard’s 
constitutionality. See id. at 2145 (“A statute directing an agency to regulate private conduct to the extent 
‘feasible’ can have many possible meanings: It might refer to ‘technological’ feasibility, ‘economic’ 
feasibility, ‘administrative’ feasibility, or even ‘political’ feasibility. Such an ‘evasive standard’ could 
threaten the separation of powers if it effectively allowed the agency to make the ‘important policy 
choices’ that belong to Congress while frustrating ‘meaningful judicial review.’ And that seems exactly 
the case here, where the Attorney General is left free to make all the important policy decisions and it is 
difficult to see what standard a court might later use to judge whether he exceeded the bounds of the 
authority given to him.”). 
 108 Id. at 2140 n.63 (quoting WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 
217 (1974)). The quote continues: “‘Public interest’ is too vague a standard to be left to free-wheeling 
administrators. They should be more closely confined to specific ends or goals.” Id. 
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of much modern regulatory activity.109 The dissenting opinion also notably 
draws on scholarship arguing explicitly that key components of the modern 
state—including provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the 
Communications Act of 1934, and the Clean Air Act—are “easy cases” for 
unconstitutional delegations.110 Given these signals throughout the opinion, 
many will not be comforted by the dissent’s insistence that nothing it says 
would “spell doom for what some call the ‘administrative state.’”111 
Given the split nature of this decision, it remains unclear whether doom 
is on its way. Since Gundy, there has been no shortage of predictions about 
how Justice Kavanaugh would rule if the nondelegation issue were raised in 
a new case.112 When sitting on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, then-Judge 
Kavanaugh certainly was skeptical of creative congressional delegations and 
willing to deploy his own reading of the text and structure of the Constitution 
to strike down institutional experiments by Congress.113 And more recently, 
Justice Kavanaugh has signaled his agreement with the dissenters’ 
arguments in Gundy.114 Nevertheless, as Adrian Vermeule recently pointed 
out, when it comes to dismantling the nondelegation doctrine, there is a big 
difference between talking the talk in dissent and walking the walk in a 
controlling opinion, and there is some history of conservative-leaning 
Justices doing the former but not the latter.115 There may thus be reason to 
 
 109 See, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214 (1943) (upholding Section 303 of 
the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2012), which enables the Federal Communications 
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guide regulatory policymaking. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130 (plurality opinion) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1701z-
2(a) (2012) and 47 U.S.C. § 903(d)(1) (2012)). 
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suspect that a modified version of the status quo could continue, with 
nondelegation continuing to serve only a background role as a canon of 
avoidance and statutory construction.116 
Nevertheless, the retrograde transmission belt model of administration 
implied in the Gundy dissent does signal a profound shift in the intellectual 
project of the U.S. administrative state. The dissent’s particular view of the 
nondelegation doctrine draws its normative force from a relatively inactive 
administration: Congress either reaches agreement through robust 
deliberation on the precise parameters of its delegation or it does not delegate 
at all, and either outcome is assumed to vindicate individual liberty.117 In 
reaction to this position, defenders of the administrative state are forced to 
justify not only particular regulatory programs, but the very act of regulation 
itself as an enterprise that can equally be supportive of some constellation of 
constitutional values. This reactive position can be seen in recent work that 
warns of “anti-administrativist” tendencies on the Court and attempts to offer 
a comprehensive constitutional justification for the administrative state.118 
This realignment heralds a return to old-style legitimacy politics, and a 
turn away from the Fullerian spirit discussed above. When the very existence 
of the bureaucracy is at stake, there is little room for cautious optimists to 
treat the regulatory state as a permanent problem, or even to be entirely 
candid as to their own skepticism about its legitimacy. Instead, the 
administrative state is presented and defended as already legitimate. On the 
other side, anti-administrativist forces call into question the entire regulatory 
enterprise by reference to the imagined legitimacy of a romanticized past. 
Neither of these positions takes seriously the legitimacy of institutions as 
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they actually exist—always in doubt, failing to live up to their boldest 
promises, and suggestive of alternative futures. 
III. LEGITIMACY’S END 
In short, the immediate consequence of the rising anti-administrativism 
on the Court may be a fundamental shift in the terms of our engagement with 
what it means to be legitimately and democratically governed. For four 
decades, mainstream administrative law offered a singular laboratory for 
problematizing and rethinking what it means to be democratically governed 
under contemporary conditions. This was an oddly critical counterpoint to 
much normative legal and political theory, which during the same period 
remained concerned with defending the legitimacy of some idealized 
conception of liberal democracy. But this experimental spirit was only made 
possible by the recognized breakdown of the administrative transmission 
belt. The Court’s latest effort to jumpstart that transmission belt thus signals 
a return to dueling visions of the ideal constitutional structure, which 
threatens to crowd out any remaining attempts at experimentation. It 
therefore serves to close by reflecting on what may come next. 
The same week that Gundy was handed down, intellectuals recognized 
the ninetieth birthday of Jürgen Habermas. For much of his life, Habermas 
has worked firmly in the Western philosophical tradition, taking as his 
central problem the “legitimacy” of power relations.119 Habermas’s 
“discourse” theory of democracy—which takes as its regulative ideal the 
concept of rational, unforced deliberation—appears at first blush to be well-
suited to address the tensions between technocratic rationality and political 
action in the modern administrative state.120 And, indeed, Habermas’s theory 
has provoked a great deal of thinking about administration and democracy, 
both in the United States and beyond.121 
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Longtime critic Raymond Geuss took the opportunity of this day to call 
into question the legacy of Habermas and his fellow travelers. For Geuss, the 
Western philosophical tradition need not be preoccupied with legitimating 
the existing institutions of liberal democracy. He writes: 
[I]t is a Kantian prejudice that “legitimation” is the basic problem of philosophy 
or even the basic problem of philosophy in the modern era. It is even less 
plausible to think that it is the basic social problem of the modern world . . . . 
The foolish claim that “we live in the best of all possible worlds” is not the best 
defense of the status quo. It is much more effective to hide one’s affirmation of 
the given social and economic structures, while trumpeting the opportunities 
one’s philosophy provides for criticizing a wide variety of individual flaws, 
defects and inadequacies. An ideology of “discursive criticism” also has much 
better chances of establishing itself because of certain psychological advantages 
it gives to those who adopt it. It is well suited to absorb, deflect and channel 
destructive energies that might otherwise get out of hand, by, thanks be to Kant, 
imposing discipline on existing discontent and dissipating it in small packets of 
reformist criticism of individual imperfections and blemishes of the social 
system.122 
At the risk of aggrandizing this corner of U.S. law, it may serve to think 
of recent developments in the administrative state as being consistent with 
this broader pull away from the politics of legitimacy. A clash between so-
called administrativist and anti-administrativist forces would in some sense 
be the reduction to absurdity of Western thought’s concern with legitimating 
state institutions. The diffusion of coercive public power throughout a vast, 
impersonal bureaucracy that is largely unintelligible to the average citizen 
cannot be said to be unproblematically “legitimate” in any meaningful sense 
of that term. At the same time, there is likely no danger of the anti-
administrativist position casting the United States back to the nineteenth 
century, simply because the practical constraints are just too strong.123 The 
most likely outcome of this clash, then, is a case-by-case resolution of 
challenges to the administrative state, with each side retroactively claiming 
legitimacy from its preferred source. 
From the perspective of critical theory, this development could be 
viewed as an opportunity. As the Fullerian period of U.S. administrative law 
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comes to a close,124 there is no longer any need for quasi-critical theory to act 
as the handmaiden of existing institutions and power relations. Critical work 
on the administrative state will no longer have to reduce itself to what Geuss 
evocatively calls “small packets of reformist criticism” in order to be heard, 
because no one will be listening. There will be no need to compromise the 
impulse to radical critique by, for example, accepting the false necessity of 
bureaucracy, or by treating the elected legislature as a yardstick for 
legitimacy. Meanwhile, the clash between opposing forces over the existing 
administrative state will continue to litter corners of U.S. administrative law 
with the vestiges of past and discarded solutions, ripe for recombination in 
new constructive-critical projects.125 
But that critical project would not be a mainstream one. The turn away 
from the Fullerian spirit in administrative law would spell the end of one 
interesting corner of U.S. legal theory and practice, where it was acceptable 
to openly question what it means to be democratically governed under 
conditions of deepening complexity. The critical method and the drive for 
legitimation were perhaps always uneasy partners in this endeavor, and their 
coexistence surely kept out some of the more unruly responses to the 
dominant political order. But, in exchange, this partnership created a space 
where experiments in legitimacy could be carried out with the backing of the 
state and interrogated openly and critically. If that searching intellectual 
project is lost—and the constellation of decisions in Gundy suggests that it 
is—then that is something to be mourned. 
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